Invariance of the distribution of the maximum by Fosgerau, Mogens et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Invariance of the distribution of the
maximum
Mogens Fosgerau and Per Olov Lindberg and Lars-Go¨ran
Mattsson and Jo¨rgen Weibull
Technical University of Denmark and Centre for Transport Studies,
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden, Department of
Transport Science and Centre for Transport Studies, KTH Royal
Institute of Technology, Department of Transport Science and
Centre for Transport Studies, KTH Royal Institute of Technology,
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics;
Department of Mathematics, KTH Royal Institute of Technology;
and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63529/
MPRA Paper No. 63529, posted 10 April 2015 20:45 UTC
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Abstract. Many models in economics involve probabilistic choices
where each decision-maker selects the best alternative from a nite set. Viewing
the value of each alternative as a random variable, the analyst is then interested
in the choice probabilities, that is, the probability for an alternative to give the
maximum value. Much analytical power can be gained, both for positive and
normative analysis, if the maximum value is statistically independent of which
alternative obtains the highest value. This note synthesizes and generalizes
previous results on this invariance property. We provide characterizations of
the property within a wide class of distributions that comprises the McFadden
GEV class, show implications in several directions, and establish connections
with copulas. We illustrate the usefulness of the invariance property by way of
a few examples.
Keywords: Choice, random utility, extreme value, leader-maximum, in-
variance, independence.
JEL codes: C10, C25, D01.
This note characterizes, within certain much-used function classes, those multi-
variate probability distributions that have a certain remarkable and useful invariance
property that can be informally described as follows. Consider a population of con-
sumers who face a nite set of alternatives, say, lunch restaurants. At each time a
choice is made, the consumer chooses exactly one of the restaurants; he or she is well
informed and chooses the one that she nds best. Her choice of restaurant will result
in an experienced utility. Let us now compare the experienced utility distributions
at the restaurants. The invariance property holds if these distributions are the same
for all restaurants. In a statistical sense then, people are thus just as satised in one
restaurant as in another. The reason why such invariance may even be a possibility
is that consumers make voluntary and well-informed choices. The randomness is only
in the eyes of the outside observer, who does not know every individuals preferences,
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only the population distribution of preferences. Imagine that one restaurant improves
its food quality or services and/or reduces its prices, and assume that all consumers
are informed of this change. Some consumers will then switch to this restaurant from
the one they used to go to. The ones who are most eager to do this are those who
were least happy at their original restaurant, which they before found to be the best,
but no longer so. Since the least happy left, average experienced utility of those who
remain in their usual restaurants goes up. If the invariance property holds, the new
utility distributions, among clients in the restaurants after one improved its services,
will again be identical across restaurants, but now at a higher level.
The invariance property leads to analytical simplication in many applications
including discrete choice with an outside option, rent seeking, innovation contests,
patent races, and auctions, see Section 3. First, however, Section 1 provides general
denitions and some preliminaries. Our main results are presented in Section 2.
Section 4 discusses a number of earlier contributions.
1. Definitions and preliminaries
Let N be the positive integers, R be the reals and R+ the non-negative reals. Denote
by F the class of cumulative distribution functions F : Rn ! [0; 1] that are twice
continuously di¤erentiable and have positive continuous density on some product set
Dn  Rn, where n 2 N and D is an open (bounded or unbounded) interval in R.
Let X = (X1; :::; Xn) be a random vector distributed according to some such F .
(We write vectors in bold-face.) Let X^ = maxj Xj be the maximum of the random
vector and let F^ denote its c.d.f.. We write Fj for the partial derivative of F with
respect to its jth variable and F (j) for the jth marginal distribution of the multivariate
distribution F . Dene the selection  2 J = f1; ::; ng by  = arg maxj Xj, where the
latter set with probability one is a singleton. Let pj = P ( = j). One may also
consider the distribution of the maximum conditional on the selection of a particular
alternative j 2 J : F^ (j) (t) = P

X^  t j  = j

. In a discrete-choice setting, F^ (j)
is the distribution of achieved (or experienced) utility, conditional on the choice of
alternative j 2 J , and pj is its choice probability.
It is relatively straight-forward to prove the following three equalities:1
pj =
R
Fj (s; :::; s) ds 8j 2 J
F^ (j) (t) = p 1j 
R t
 1 Fj (s; :::; s) ds 8j 2 J; t 2 R
F^ (t) = F (t; :::; t) 8t 2 R:
(1)
We note that pj > 0 for all j 2 J , and that the quantities in (1) only depend on
how the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F 2 F behaves near the diagonal
of its domain. By invariancewe mean that the conditional distributions F^ (j) are
identical across alternatives j 2 J :
1See e.g. Lindberg, Eriksson and Mattsson (1995) and Lindberg (2012).
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Denition 1. Amultivariate distribution F has the Invariance Property if F^ (j) =
F^ for all j 2 J . A random vector X has the Invariance Property if its distribution
has the Invariance Property.
The following proposition, stated without proof, provides some immediate con-
clusions regarding the Invariance Property. We use the notational convention that a
univariate function applied to a vector is applied to each component of the vector.
Proposition 1. Consider a random vector X with c.d.f. F 2 F .
(i) If Xj are i.i.d. then X has the Invariance Property.
(ii) If X has the Invariance Property and T : R ! R is a strictly increasing
function, then T (X) has the Invariance Property.
(iii) X has the Invariance Property if and only if the selection  and the maximum
X^ are independent.
We will express results in terms of so-called copulas. These are functions on the
unit cubes in Euclidean spaces, dened as follows (see Nelsen, 2006, for an excellent
introduction):
Denition 2. A copula is any function C : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1] such that
(i) C (x) = 0 if j2Jxj = 0,
(ii) C (x) = xk if j2Jnfkgxj = 1,
(iii) If x;y 2 [0; 1]n and x  y, then VC ([x;y])  0.
Here [x;y] denotes the box nj=1 [xj; yj]  [0; 1]n and VC ([x;y]) is the C-volume
of this box, dened as the signed sum of the values C (v) at all vertices v of [x;y],
where the sign is positive (negative) if vj = xj for an even (odd) number of coordinates
j 2 J . Condition (iii) ensures that the copula assigns non-negative probability mass
to any box. By construction, copulas are then c.d.f.s on the unit cube that have
uniform marginal distributions.
By Sklars theorem (e.g. Theorem 2.10.9 in Nelsen, 2006), every multivariate
distribution F : Rn ! [0; 1] can be written in terms of its marginal distributions
F (j) and a copula C, so that F (x) = C
 
F (1) (x1) ; :::; F
(n) (xn)

for all x 2 Rn. The
copula associated with any c.d.f. thus captures the statistical dependence structure
of the multivariate distribution in question.
In order to state our main result we dene the class of copulas that are associ-
ated with multivariate extreme-value (MEV) distributions, to be calledMEV copulas.
A multivariate extreme-value (MEV) distribution is any multivariate distribution H
with non-degenerate margins for which there exists an i.i.d. sequence of random
vectors, (Xm)m2N, all distributed according to some multivariate c.d.f. F , and nor-
malizing vectors am > 0 and bm for each m 2 N such that, with component-wise
maximization, multiplication and division,
lim
m!1
P

max1lmXl   bm
am
 x

= lim
m!1
[F (amx+ bm)]
m = H (x) ;
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(see Joe, 1997).2 MEV copulas can be shown to be exactly those copulas that satisfy
the following homogeneity property
C (x1 ; :::; x

n) = [C (x1; :::; xn)]
 8x 2 (0; 1)n , 8 > 0:
We prove this claim in Lemma 1 in the Appendix, thereby completing an argument
given in Joe (1997).
2. Results
The main result of this note is the following theorem, which generalizes previous
results, see Section 4. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Consider any F 2 F such that F (x) = C  F (1) (x1) ; :::; F (n) (xn) 8x 2
Rn for some MEV copula C that is twice continuously di¤erentiable on the unit cube.
Then F and all the multivariate marginal distributions of F have the Invariance
Property if and only if for each j 2 J there exists a j > 0 such that F (j) =

F (1)
j .
The condition that the marginal distributions are positive powers of each other
has special signicance when the marginal distribution F (1) is standard extreme-value
type 1 (Gumbel). Then F (j) (t) = exp (  exp [ t+ lnj]), meaning that the marginal
distributions are identical up to a location shift. Conversely, under the hypothesis
of Theorem 1 it is straightforward to establish that if the Invariance Property is
preserved under all location shifts of X then the marginal distributions must be
extreme-value type 1. An MEV distribution with type 1 margins is the basis of the
well-known logit family of models, pioneered by McFadden (1974, 1978, 1981).
Theorem 1 characterizes the Invariance Property for those distributions in F that
have twice continuously di¤erentiable MEV copulas. Could it be that invariance of
a probability distribution is equivalent to the distribution having an MEV copula
and marginal distributions that are powers of each other? That conjecture is false
because, as noted above, invariance depends only on the properties of the distribution
on the diagonal L = fx 2 Dn : x1 = ::: = xng of its domain:
Proposition 2. Consider any distributions F; ~F 2 F on the same domain Dn. If F
has the Invariance Property and ~F = F on an open neighborhood of L, then also ~F
has the Invariance Property.
The next proposition shows that the Invariance Property is preserved under ag-
gregation of components to blocks represented by their maximal member.
Proposition 3. Suppose that X = (X1; :::; Xn) has the Invariance Property, and
consider any partition of J into k subsets Ji. For each subset Ji let Yi = maxj2Ji (Xj).
Then Y = (Y1; :::; Yk) has the Invariance Property.
2More precisely, if Xm = (Xm1; ::; Xmn), then max1lmXm is the vector with jth component
max1lmXlj , and amx is the vector with jth component amjxj .
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3. Applications
This section discusses a number of economics contexts in which the Invariance Prop-
erty is useful. Throughout we rely on the equivalence of the Invariance Property to
the independence of the selection  and the maximum X^.
3.1. Discrete choice with outside option. The probabilistic basis of a discrete
choice model is a random vector X of (indirect) utilities, each associated with an
alternative j 2 J . The decision-maker, or, as we will here say, the consumer, chooses
the alternative with the highest utility. Such a discrete choice model is also embedded
in models of monopolistic competition (Sattinger, 1984; Perlo¤ and Salop, 1985). In
many applications, consumers also have an outside option. The utility associated
with the outside option acts as a threshold such that the consumer only chooses one
of the alternatives in J if the utility of that alternative exceeds that of the outside
option. We shall see that such situations are easily treated when the random utilities
have the Invariance Property. This seems not to have been observed before.
Suppose then that X has the Invariance Property, and that alternative j is chosen
if Xj = X^ and X^ > X0, where X0 is the random utility of the outside option, which
we take to be statistically independent from X. Let F0 be the c.d.f. of X0. We still
use  to denote the alternative in J = f1; :::; ng with maximum utility. The outside
option is labelled j = 0, and  2 f0g[J denotes the chosen option among all options.
The probability for the outside option is
P ( = 0) = P

X^  X0

=
Z
F (s; ::; s) dF0 (s) ;
a probability that can be calculated from the primitives of the model.
It follows from Proposition 1 (iii) that P

 = j j X^ > s

= pj for any j 2 J and
s 2 R. Thus,
P ( = j) = P

 = j ^ X^ > X0

=
Z
P

 = j j X^ > s

 P

X^ > s

dF0 (s)
= pj  [1  P ( = 0)] :
The presence of an outside option does not a¤ect the probabilities of the inside
options, conditional on the outside option not being chosen.
3.2. Rent-seeking, innovation contests and patent races. Baye and Hoppe
(2003) establish the strategic equivalence between wide classes of rent-seeking games,
innovation contests and patent-races. In their innovation-contest game, n rms com-
pete by employing a nite and positive number of scientists, where each scientist costs
c > 0 and independently produces an innovation of a random value with c.d.f. H on
the unit interval. All rms pay the costs of their scientists, and the rm with the best
idea among all rms wins the value of its best idea. The other rms win nothing.
Let Xj be the value of rm js best idea and let X = (X1; ::; Xn). Then X has
the joint c.d.f. F (x1; ::; xn) =
Qn
j=1 F
(j) (xj), where F (j) (xj) = [H (xj)]
mj and mj
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is the number of scientists at rm j. Clearly F has the invariance property, since
F (j) =
 
F (1)
mj=m1for all j 2 J = f1; ::; ng. By Proposition 1 (iii), the identity  2 J
of the rm that wins the contest and the value X^ of the best idea are statistically
independent. Hence, the expected prot to rm j from hiring mj 2 N scientists can
be expressed as
j (m1; ::;mn) = P ( = j)  E(X^)  c mj
where P ( = j) = mj=M for M = m1 + ::+mn, and
E(X^) =
1Z
0
P (X^ > s)ds = 1 
1Z
0
F^ (s)ds = 1 
1Z
0
[H(s)]M ds:
Hence,
j (m1; ::;mn) =
24 1
M
0@1  1Z
0
[H(s)]M ds
1A  c
35 mj
This setting can be generalized in several ways within our framework. The R&D
inputs mj may be any positive real numbers, and the c.d.f. H may be dened on
any interval. Moreover, the marginal c.d.f. F (j) of the value of the best idea within
any rm j may be of the power form H'j(mj) for any positive increasing function 'j
of its R&D input mj. For example, an S-shaped such function could represent the
"synergy" or "critical mass" e¤ect that the marginal return (in terms of innovations
or discoveries) from an additional scientist may be highest at some intermediate size
of the research unit. Moreover, by using MEV copulas, one may allow for statistical
dependence among the values of the best ideas in the di¤erent rms. For instance,
using the linearly homogenous function G in Lemma 1, one obtains
P ( = j) =
'j (mj) Gj ('1 (m1) ; ::; 'n (mn))
G ('1 (m1) ; ::; 'n (mn))
from Theorem 1 in Mattsson, Weibull and Lindberg (2014), and E(X^) can be derived
from the c.d.f. F^ = HG('1(m1);::;'n(mn)) of X^. We conjecture that the results in Baye
and Hoppe (2003) can be generalized, by use of the invariance property, in many
important directions for a wide variety of innovation contests, patent races and rent-
seeking games.
3.3. Auctions. Following Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Krishna (2002) we
briey consider auctions for an indivisible item in a situation where each bidder j 2 J
has private information about the item for sale in the form of a random signal Xj.
The signal vector X = (X1; :::; Xn) has positive dependence among the components,
formalized as a¢ liation (see Krishna, 2002). More precisely, assume that all signals
take values in some interval D  R+, and let F : Dn ! [0; 1] be the joint c.d.f. of
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the signal vector X with density f : Dn ! R+. The signals are (positively) a¢ liated
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982) if
f (x)  f (y)  f (x _ y)  f (x ^ y)
for all x;y 2 Dn.3 We now add the assumption that the distribution F of X takes
the form F (x) = C ( (x1)
1 ; :::; (xn)
n) for some MEV copula C, univariate c.d.f.
, and constants j > 0; j 2 J . To the best of our knowledge, this assumption is
new to the auction literature.4 We proceed to show that it is useful.
A strategy for bidder j is any measurable function j : D ! R+ that maps bidder
js private signal Xj to a bid j (Xj). We proceed to calculate the distribution and
expectation of the highest and second-highest bids for the case when all bidders use
the same strictly increasing strategy .5 The bidder with the highest signal, X^, then
makes the highest bid, (X^), and wins the auction. The distribution of the highest bid
is easy to obtain. Writing 	 (t) for 

 1 (t)

, c for C (e 1 ; :::; e n), and recalling
that C is a MEV copula, we nd that the distribution of the maximum bid is
P
h


X^

 t
i
= C (	 (t)1 ; :::;	 (t)n) = C
 
e 1(  ln 	(t)); :::; e n(  ln 	(t))

= c  ln 	(t) = exp

ln
h
	 (t)  ln c
i
= 	 (t)  ln c :
The inverse of the c.d.f. of the highest bid 

X^

is the mapping s ! 	 1

s 
1
ln c

.
Hence, the expected maximum bid is
E
h


X^
i
=
Z 1
0
	 1

s 
1
ln c

ds =
Z 1
0


 1

s 
1
ln c

ds:
Writing cj for C (e 1 ; ::; 1; ::; e n), where e j in position j is replaced by 1, it
is also straightforward to derive the distribution of the second highest bid, X^(2) (the
actual payment in a second-price auction):
P
h


X^(2)

 t
i
= P
h
X^   1 (t)
i
+
+
nX
j=1
[C (	 (t)1 ; ::; 1; ::;	 (t)n)  C (	 (t)1 ; :::;	 (t)n)]
=
nX
j=1
	 (t)  ln cj   (n  1) 	 (t)  ln c :
3This property is known in the statistics literature as multivariate total positivity (MTP2) of the
density, see e.g. Karlin and Rinott (1980). See also Krishna (2002).
4Joe (1997) collects some results showing the relationship between a¢ liation and MEV copula.
If a density is MTP2 then all bivariate margins of the c.d.f. are max-innitely divisible (Thm. 2.3,
2.5 and 2.6). Any MEV copula is max-innitely divisible. Thus a¢ liation and MEV copula are
related concepts.
5Such monotonicity is known to hold in symmetric equilibria in sealed-bid rst-price and second-
price auctions, see e.g. Krishna (2002).
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The expectation of the second highest bid is then
E
h


X^(2)
i
=
Z 1
0
 
1 
nX
j=1
	 (t)  ln cj + (n  1) 	 (t)  ln c
!
dt
=
nX
j=1
Z 1
0
h
1 	 (t)  ln cj
i
dt   (n  1)
Z 1
0
h
1 	 (t)  ln c
i
dt
=
nX
j=1
Z 1
0


 1

s
  1
ln cj

ds  (n  1)E
h


X^
i
:
We thus have explicit expressions for the distribution and expectation of the highest
and second highest bids. By the Invariance Property, the probability distributions of
the highest and second-highest bids are independent of which bidder actually won.
We nally note that these derivations were made without any symmetry assump-
tion concerning the distribution of the signal vector X. In particular, asymmetric
statistical dependency among bidderssignals is permitted.
4. Previous literature
Researchers in economics and in probability theory have returned to the topic of
invariance a number of times. This section presents a summary and highlights how
our results are related to earlier results.
Strauss (1979, Theorem 5) claimed that if the components of a random vector X
are of the additive formXj = j+Zj, where the j:s are scalars and Z is a random vec-
tor with c.d.f. F , then the Invariance Property holds if and only if F (z) =  [G (e z)]
for some positive homogenous function G (with positive degree) and some function
 : R+ ! [0; 1] such that F is a c.d.f.6 It is straightforward to show that the
subset of such functions G that are linearly homogenous corresponds exactly to the
set of MEV copula (see Lemma 1). Strauss (1979, Theorem 4) further showed that
the multinomial logit model is the only additive random utility model with indepen-
dent error terms Zj for which the Invariance Property holds. Anas and Feng (1988)
later showed that the multinomial logit model has the weaker Invariance Property
E
h
X^j
i
= E
h
X^
i
for all j 2 J . This follows, however, directly from Strauss (1979).
de Palma and Kilani (2007) also considered the additive random utility case with
independent error terms and reproved Theorem 4 by Strauss (1979). They also proved
the stronger claim that for error terms that are i.i.d. with nite expectation, the above
Invariance Property of the conditional expected maximum utility for any choice of the
i:s, is equivalent to the error terms being extreme-value type 1 (Gumbel) distributed.
The if-part is the same as the previous claim by Anas and Feng (1988).
Also Train and Wilson (2008) derived the Invariance Property for Gumbel distrib-
uted random variables. They used this property for maximum likelihood estimation in
6The same claim was essentially proved by Robertson and Strauss (1981), with Lindberg, Eriksson
and Mattsson (1995) completing the argument.
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a class of combined stated- and revealed-preference experiments, where each respon-
dent considered the same alternatives in both experiments and where the attributes
of the alternatives in the stated-preference experiments were varied on the basis of
the respondents revealed-preference choice.
Our Theorem 1 states that, for any multivariate distribution with MEV copula,
the Invariance Property holds for all multivariate marginal distributions if and only if
the univariate marginal distributions are positive powers of each other. A special case
of this result was given by Resnick and Roy (1990b) who showed that MEV distrib-
utions with Gumbel marginals have the Invariance Property. Mattsson, Weibull and
Lindberg (2014) generalized this to the "if" claim in the present Theorem 1. Resnick
and Roy (1990a) proved a special case of the "only if" claim in our Theorem 1,
namely that the Invariance Property for two independent non-negative random vari-
ables implies that their c.d.f.:s are positive powers of each other. Mattsson, Weibull
and Lindberg (2014) generalized this to an arbitrary nite number of independent
random variables.
5. Appendix
The following Lemma is essentially in Joe (1997) but the proof given there is incom-
plete.
Lemma 1. A copula C is a copula of an MEV distribution if and only if it is of the
form
C (x) = exp ( G (  lnx)) (2)
for some linearly homogenous function G.
Proof. Necessity: Note with Joe (1997, p. 173-174) that an MEV copula C must
satisfy C (x) = C (x) for all x 2 (0; 1)n and  > 0: Then G (y)    lnC (e y) is
linearly homogenous.
Su¢ ciency: Suppose C has the form (2). Let F be a c.d.f. with copula C and
marginals that are unit exponential on the negative half-axis, i.e. Fi (x) = ex on
( 1; 0]. Then F (x) = C (ex). Let Xj = (Xj1; :::; Xjn) be i.i.d. with c.d.f. F , and
let Mki = maxjkXji. Let Y
k =
 
kMk1 ; :::; kM
k
n

, then Yk has the c.d.f.
P
 
Yk  x = P  kMk1 ; :::; kMkn  (x1; :::; xn)
= P

max
jk
Xj1; :::;max
jk
Xjn


x1
k
; :::;
xn
k

=
Y
jk
P
h
(Xj1; :::; Xjn) 
x1
k
; :::;
xn
k
i
= C
 
ex1=k; :::; exn=k
k
= C (ex) :
Thus all Yk have the same distribution, and hence they converge in distribution to
Y1, say, with the same c.d.f. C (ex). Therefore C (ex) is the c.d.f. of an MEV
distribution, and C is an MEV copula.
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Proof of Theorem 1. Su¢ ciency: This follows from Theorem 1 in Mattsson,
Weibull and Lindberg (2014), combined with the observation that the multivariate
marginal distributions of MEV copula are also MEV copula, and that twice di¤eren-
tiability is inherited.
Necessity: Consider the c.d.f. P (X1  x1; X2  x2) = F (x1; x2;1; :::;1) =
C
 
F (1) (x1) ; F
(2) (x2) ; 1; :::; 1

. By the assumptions of the theorem, this c.d.f. has
the Invariance Property. Furthermore, since F and C are twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable then also F (i) and P (X1  x1; X2  x2) are twice continuously di¤erentiable.
The copula for (X1; X2) inherits the MEV property from C by continuity. We may
thus ignore the last but two dimensions of F and C and assume that J = 2 at no
loss of generality. Hence, let X = (X1; X2) have multivariate c.d.f. F 2 F on D2 for
some open interval D  R. Then
F (x) = C
 
F (1) (x1) ; F
(2) (x2)

;
where C is an MEV copula that by assumption is twice continuously di¤erentiable
and F has the Invariance Property. We have to show that F (2) =

F (1)

for some
 > 0. By Lemma 1, we may equivalently write
F (x) = exp
  G    lnF (1) (x1) ;  lnF (2) (x2) ; (3)
where G is linearly homogenous and satises the properties necessary for F to be a
c.d.f. We have assumed that C is twice continuously di¤erentiable and then so is G.
By Proposition 1, the Invariance Property remains under any strictly increasing
transformation of the components. Hence, it is no loss of generality to apply such a
transformation so that F (1)(x1) = ex1 on D = ( 1; 0). By (1) we then have, for all
t 2 D,
F^ (1) (t) =
1
p1
Z t
 1
F (s; s)G1
  s;  lnF (2) (s) ds =
F^ (2) (t) =
1
p2
Z t
 1
F (s; s)G2
  s;  lnF (2) (s) f (2) (s)
F (2) (s)
ds;
where f (2) is the density of F (2) and pi is dened in (1), for i = 1; 2. Di¤erentiation
with respect to t 2 D gives
1
p1
F (t; t)G1
  t;  lnF (2) (t) = 1
p2
F (t; t)G2
  t;  lnF (2) (t)  f (2) (t)
F (2) (t)
or
f (2) (t) =
p2G1
  t;  lnF (2) (t)
p1G2 ( t;  lnF (2) (t))  F
(2) (t) 8t 2 D: (4)
Given p1; p2, let  solve G1 (1; ) =G (1; ) = p1; such  always exists since the map-
ping from  > 0 to (0; 1) is surjective (Norets and Takahashi, 2013). Then it is
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easily veried that F (2) () = F (1) () = exp ( ()) is a solution to (4) and that
p2 = P (X2 > X1) if (X1; X2) is distributed according to C
 
F (1); F (2)

.
It remains to prove that no other solution to (4) exists that leads to the same
value of p1; p2. According to the Picard-Lindelöf Theorem (see e.g. Theorem 3.1
in Hale (1969)), such an ordinary di¤erential equation has a unique (local) solution
through any given point
 
t0; F
(2) (t0)
 2 D  (0; 1) if 	 (t; x) = p2G1( t;  lnx)
p1G2( t;  lnx)  x
denes a continuous function on D  (0; 1) that is locally Lipschitz continuous in
x. By assumption on C, G12 and G22 are continuous, and we also have G2 > 0,
so 	 is continuously di¤erentiable, and hence also locally Lipschitz continuous, in x.
Any local solution can be uniquely extended to a maximal solution on a subinterval
D0  D (see e.g. pages 17-18 in Hale (1969)). Either D0 = D or the solution attains
the value 0 at the lower bound of D0 or the value 1 at its upper bound. In either
case, f (2) (t) = 0 at such a point. Then the solution extends uniquely to all of D by
letting F (2) be 0 below D0 and 1 above. Moreover, by the Picard-Lindelöf theorem,
an alternative solution, ~F (2), if it exists, cannot intersect the solution, F (2), anywhere
in D0. Hence, ~F (2) (t) either lies above or below our solution for all t 2 D0. Assume
it always lies above; F (2) < ~F (2) (the opposite case can be treated in the same way).
Dene the random vector Z = (Z1; Z2) such that its c.d.f. is the above copula C (on
[0; 1]2). Let F (i) be the inverse of F (i), for i = 1; 2, and let ~F (2) be the inverse of
~F (2).7 Clearly ~F (2) < F (2).
Let the random vector Y = (Y1; Y2) = (F (1)(Z1); F (2)(Z2)). Then Y has the
c.d.f.
FY (y) = P

Z1  F (1)(y1) ^ Z2  F (2)(y2)

= C(F (1)(y1); F
(2)(y2)):
By the choice of , p2 = P (Y2  Y1) = P

F (2)(Z2)  F (1)(Z1)

. Similarly, the
random vector ~Y = (Y1; ~Y2) = (F (1)(Z1); ~F (2)(Z2)) has the c.d.f. ~F (y1; y2) =
C(F (1)(y1); ~F
(2)(y2)). We assume that ~F (2) also satises the boundary condition p2 =
P ( ~Y2  Y1) = P
h
~F (2)(Z2)  F (1)(Z1)
i
. But since ~F (2) < F (2),
p2 = P

F (2)(Z2)  F (1)(Z1)

> P
h
~F (2)(Z2)  F (1)(Z1)
i
= p2;
a contradiction. Then F (2) is the unique solution to (4) and the boundary condition
p2 = P

F (2)(Z2)  F (1)(Z1)

.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let X have the invariance property, i.e., F^ (j) = F^ for all
j. It is su¢ cient to establish the proposition for the case when two alternatives, say
1 and 2, are merged via the maximum operation. Dene Y = X1 _X2: It is su¢ cient
7These inverse functions are well-dened since F has positive density on D2.
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to show that P (Y  t j  2 f1; 2g) = F^ (t). But
P (Y  t j  2 f1; 2g) = P ([Y  t] ^ [ 2 f1; 2g])
P ( 2 f1; 2g)
=
P ([Y  t] ^ [ = 1]) + P ([Y  t] ^ [ = 2])
p1 + p2
=
P (Y  t j  = 1)P ( = 1) + P (Y  t j  = 2)P ( = 2)
p1 + p2
=
p1
p1 + p2
F^ 1 (t) +
p2
p1 + p2
F^ 2 (t) = F^ (t) :
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